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 By extending isospin symmetry from a “global” to a “local” gauge symmetry, Yang and1
Mills(1954) produced the first of the gauge theories that now bear their name. These theories are
now fundamental to the Standard Model of elementary particles. Flavor SU(3) symmetry was key
to the origin of the quark model. BRST symmetry, and symmetries associated with the
renormalization group, are now basic theoretical tools of high energy and condensed matter
physics.
 Earman(1989) gave a classic analysis of the relation between dynamical and space-time2
symmetries of a theory. A number of essays in Brading and Castellani(2003) distinguish different
kinds of symmetry that may be associated with a theory.
Perfect Symmetries
Abstract
While empirical symmetries relate situations, theoretical symmetries relate models of a theory we
use to represent them. An empirical symmetry is perfect if and only if any two situations it relates
share all intrinsic properties. Sometimes one can use a theory to explain an empirical symmetry
by showing how it follows from a corresponding theoretical symmetry. The theory then reveals a
perfect symmetry. I say what this involves and why it matters, beginning with a puzzle which is
resolved by the subsequent analysis. I conclude by pointing to applications and implications of
the ideas developed earlier in the paper. 
1. Introduction
The importance of symmetry principles in physical theory is now widely acknowledged among
both physicists and philosophers. Reflection on increasingly abstract symmetries has become an
important heuristic in theory construction . Philosophers have offered analyses of various kinds1
of symmetry that a theory may display, and of the relations between these . Not all symmetries of2
a theory correspond to symmetries in nature, even when that theory succeeds in representing
significant features of our world. Sometimes a theoretical symmetry is broken, as when a theory’s
equations have a solution that lacks their symmetry. Sometimes a theoretical symmetry
associated with alternative representational devices may have no empirical consequences. But in
an important class of cases one can use a theory to account for an empirical symmetry by
2exhibiting that symmetry as a consequence of a symmetry of the theory. Such explanations are
especially satisfying and may provide convincing reasons to believe the theory that makes them
possible. In such a case I shall say that the theory reveals a perfect symmetry.
A theory reveals a perfect symmetry when a theoretical symmetry implies a
corresponding empirical symmetry. In what follows I say what this involves and why it matters.
Section 2 presents a puzzle to motivate the analysis to come. Section 3 distinguishes various
kinds of empirical symmetry and illustrates them with examples. Section 4 presents an analysis
of one kind of theoretical symmetry and contrasts this with theoretical symmetries of other kinds.
Section 5 explores different ways in which a theory can explain an empirical symmetry, focusing
on the exhibition of a perfect symmetry: this section resolves section 2's puzzle.  I conclude by
pointing to applications and implications of the ideas developed earlier in the paper. The
appendix presents more details of a key argument from section 5. 
2. Is Faraday in the Same Boat as Galileo?
Here are two examples of observations of a symmetry in nature.
Galileo described the first example in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World
Systems, which contains the following famous passage.
Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin below decks on some large ship, and
have with you there some flies, butterflies, and other small flying animals. Have a large
bowl of water with some fish in it; hang up a bottle that empties drop by drop into a wide
vessel beneath it. With the ship standing still, observe carefully how the little animals fly
with equal speed to all sides of the cabin. The fish swim indifferently in all directions; the
 Galileo may have taken his observations rather to provide support for a principle of the3
relativity of uniform circular motion about the earth’s center. Galileo’s ship could not have been
moving at constant uniform velocity even if its motion across the ocean were perfectly smooth.
Horizontal motion follows the curvature of the earth; the earth rotates about its axis and orbits
the sun; etc. But observations much more precise than those described by Galileo would be
necessary to detect  the ship’s slight resulting deviation from inertial motion.
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drops fall into the vessel beneath; and, in throwing something to your friend, you need
throw it no more strongly in one direction than another, the distances being equal;
jumping with your feet together, you pass equal spaces in every direction. When you have
observed all these things carefully (though there is no doubt that when the ship is standing
still everything must happen in this way), have the ship proceed with any speed you like,
so long as the motion is uniform and not fluctuating this way and that. You will discover
not the least change in all the effects named, nor could you tell from any of them whether
the ship was moving or standing still. (Galileo 1632/1967, pp.186-7)
The observations Galileo describes provide evidence that setting a confined system in uniform
rectilinear motion has no noticeable effect on mechanical processes taking place within the
system, and is in that sense a symmetry of those situations. This symmetry is closely related to
the following relativity principle, often called the principle of Galilean relativity :3
Situations related by a transformation from one state of uniform rectilinear motion to
another are internally indistinguishable.
A uniform relative velocity transformation is a symmetry of such situations.
Galileo’s ship provides a classic illustration of an empirical symmetry. His description of
phenomena in its cabin in different states of motion supplies rich instances of that symmetry that
are apparent even in the absence of a theory capable of accounting for them. Stimulated by these
4and other phenomena, Newton later found a dynamical theory of which Galilean relativity is a
consequence, provided that the situations involve only mechanical processes conforming to his
laws of motion, and that all masses and forces involved are independent of absolute velocity.
Still later Einstein formulated a different theory (special relativity) that implies a reinterpreted
extension of Galileo’s relativity principle to all (non-gravitational) processes. I shall examine this
implication in more detail in section 5. For now only two things matter. First, observations like
those Galileo describes in this passage provide evidence that uniform velocity boosts are
empirical symmetries of such situations.  Second, these observations could be, and indeed were,
made prior to and independent of any theory capable of accounting for them.
Michael Faraday’s description of his own observations provides the second example. In
1836, Faraday constructed a hollow cube with sides 12 feet long, covered it with good
conducting materials but insulated it carefully from the ground, and electrified it to such an
extent that sparks flew from its surface. An entry in his diary entry during May 1836 reads in part
I went into this cube and lived in it, but though I used lighted candles, electrometers, and
all other tests of electrical states, I could not find the least influence upon them.
(Maxwell 1881, p. 53)
Here Faraday’s observations bear on another symmetry in nature: charging the conducting
exterior of a confined region of space has no effect on electrical phenomena in the interior of that
region. These observations are often glossed by saying that by electrifying his cube Faraday had
succeeded in raising it to a higher electric potential than the rest of his laboratory. That suggests
the following relativity principle
 Situations related by a transformation from one state of uniform electric potential to
5another are internally indistinguishable.
A uniform electric potential transformation is a symmetry of such situations. Taking this
symmetry to heart, Maxwell developed the theory of electromagnetism that bears his name.
Indeed, Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory accounts for the empirical symmetry observed by
Faraday in his cube. But Faraday needed no such theory to make his observations or to appreciate
the importance of the empirical symmetry that grounded them.
In these passages, Faraday and Galileo describe observations of symmetries in nature. In
each case, different situations are compared, and it is noted that these are indistinguishable with
respect to a whole class of phenomena. The parallels are striking. In each case, the relevant
symmetry was observed before the development of any theory capable of accounting for it. In
each case, observation of an empirical symmetry stimulated the successful construction of a
theory capable of explaining why it obtains.
The parallels appear to extend to internal features of the explanatory theories themselves.
Uniform velocity boosts are among the Galilean transformations that constitute symmetries of the
dynamics of Newton’s theory, and also among the Lorentz transformations  that constitute
symmetries of the dynamics of special relativity. The addition of a constant to all electric
potentials is among the “local” gauge transformations that constitute symmetries of Maxwell’s
electromagnetic theory.
 But now a puzzle emerges. For while the Galilean and Lorentz boost symmetry of
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories each in its own way reflects the empirical relativity of motion,
“local” gauge symmetry is usually thought of as a purely formal feature of classical
electromagnetic theory, with no empirical correlate, and indeed no empirical content. If this is
6correct then, as Brown and Brading (2004) say “there can be no analogue of the Galileo ship
experiment for local gauge transformations.” But then why doesn’t Faraday’s cube provide a
perfect analogue of Galileo’s ship for “local” gauge symmetry? To solve this puzzle it will be
necessary to achieve a better understanding of different ways in which the symmetries of a theory
may be related to the empirical symmetries it explains. The first step is to get clearer on the
nature of empirical and theoretical symmetries themselves.
3. Empirical Symmetries
Abstractly, a symmetry of a structure is an automorphism–a mapping of the elements of the
structure back onto themselves so as to preserve the structure. Formally, a structure
1 2 n iS = <D,R ,R ,…,R > consists of a domain D of elements and a sequence of relations R  (i=1,...,n)
defined on D. Let f: D ÷ D be a 1-1 mapping of the domain of S onto itself. Define the
f f 1 2  n itransformed structure S  by S  / <D, f*R , f*R ,…, f*R >, where, for each m-place relation R ., 
i 1 m i 1  m ff*R [f(d ) ,…, f(d )] if and only if R [d ,…, d ]. Then f is a symmetry of S just in case S  = S.
 Many different structures may be distinguished in a given object. If the structure is that
iof a physical object, the elements of D will generally be parts of that object, while the R  specify
properties of and relations among these parts. A physical object may have a certain size, shape,
composition and pattern of colors. But abstract objects also exhibit a variety of structures. SU(2)
is a group, it is non-Abelian, it is a Lie group (and so also a differentiable manifold), it is
compact, it is simple, etc. We are concerned here with physical theories and the situations to
which they may be applied, so we need to say what kinds of object these involve.
A physical theory specifies a set of models–mathematical structures–that may be used to
7represent various different situations, actual as well as merely possible, and to make claims about
them. Any application of a physical theory is to a situation involving some system, actual or
merely possible. Only rarely is that system the entire universe: typically, one applies a theory to
some subsystem, regarded as a relatively isolated part of its world. The application proceeds by
using the theory to model the situation of that subsystem in a way that abstracts from and
idealizes the subsystem's own features, and also neglects or idealizes its interactions with the rest
of the world.
A system may itself display a symmetric structure at a certain level of idealization. A
human body has a rough bilateral symmetry, while a carefully prepared crystal more precisely
displays a variety of symmetries. A single system may also display symmetric behavior: consider
the motion of a pendulum, or the performance of a mirror fugue. The symmetric structure in this
case is that of the situation in which the system figures rather than that of the system itself. There
are even cases in which it is hard to draw a distinction between system and situation. Think of a
possible world set in Newtonian space-time. A temporal inversion about an arbitrary temporal
instant is a symmetry of the space-time of this world.
A symmetry involving an actual physical system and its situation is empirical. One can
observe and measure the situation of the system to collect evidence that relations among its
spatiotemporal parts are or would be indifferent to the action of a symmetry transformation of
those parts. Such evidence may be direct (the crystal) or indirect (Newtonian space-time).
But Galileo’s ship illustrates the fact that not all empirical symmetries pertain to a single
situation. In that case velocity boosts are observed to be a symmetry of a class of similar but
distinct situations, in each of which the ship is moving with a different velocity. Renderings of a
8particular tune provide another example of a symmetry of a class of situations. Renderings of the
same tune all have a similar structure, even if they are in different keys and some include errors.
Flawless renderings of the same tune are related by a symmetry transformation that transposes
one key into another.
In such cases, a class of different situations constitutes the domain of a structure, and a
symmetry of that structure maps one situation onto another. Formally, suppose that situations of a
certain kind K all have a somewhat similar structure. Any situation with that structure may be
transformed into another by a transformation f. If a subset D of K is closed under f, then f is a
j jsymmetry of the “larger” structure E = < D ,P  >, where the properties P  define the kind K.
Galileo describes processes occurring in the cabin of a ship as having just the same
dynamic structure, independent of how fast the ship moves over the sea. Different instances of
each process are related by the same symmetry transformation—corresponding to a change in the
uniform horizontal velocity of the ship. Here one can think of K as a class of kinematically
possible motions of the objects in the cabin (i.e. those motions relative to the cabin in which
every object has some continuous trajectory or other), while D contains only dynamically
possible motions (i.e. just those kinematically possible motions of objects that are compatible
with the forces acting on them). Renderings of the same tune (K) all have a somewhat similar
structure, even if they are in different keys and some include errors. Flawless renderings of the
same tune (D) are related by a symmetry transformation that transposes one key into another.
One can observe and measure situations to collect evidence that situations related by a
symmetry transformation cannot be distinguished by specific procedures. Flawless renderings of
a tune in different keys can be directly distinguished by someone with perfect pitch: the rest of us
9may need instruments. According to Galileo, measurements of purely mechanical magnitudes
inside the cabin cannot distinguish between different states of uniform horizontal motion of a
ship. These are two examples of the kind of empirical symmetry among situations which will be
at the focus of interest here. They prompt the following abstract formulations.
As I will understand it, an empirical symmetry is a feature of a class of situations—actual
as well as possible. A 1-1 mapping n: S ÷ S of a set of situations onto itself is an empirical
symmetry with respect to C-type measurements if and only if no two situations related by n can
be distinguished by measurements of type C.
This is a contextual definition, since what it counts as an empirical symmetry depends on
what measurement procedures are considered. In the case of Galileo’s ship and Faraday’s cube
one context is particularly salient. It would be easy to observe the ship’s motion over the ocean
by hearing the ship’s wake or viewing it through a porthole, or by consulting a GPS device in the
cabin. It would have been only too easy for Faraday to observe the charge state of his cube by
carelessly stepping out into his laboratory, or more safely by looking for the sparks emitted by the
cube when charged. Such observations involve measurement procedures that provide (more or
less) reliable information about the relation between the situation inside the cabin/cube and its
external environment. In an idealization of the situation in which the interior is regarded as
confined in such a way as to exclude any transmissions from outside, no such information is
available within. Observations and measurements inside can then only provide information about
the intrinsic properties of the internal situation.
I shall say that a measurement is confined to a situation if and only if it is a measurement
 Intuitively, a property of an object is intrinsic if and only if the object’s having that4
property does not depend on the existence or (intrinsic!) properties of any object distinct from it.
I shall have more to say about the notion of an intrinsic property, which  has proven notoriously
resistant to deeper philosophical analysis, in the conclusion to this paper (section 6).
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of intrinsic properties of (one or more objects in) that situation.  Then a 1-1 mapping n: S ÷ S of4
a set of situations onto itself is a strong empirical symmetry if and only if no two situations related
by n can be distinguished by measurements confined to each situation. Note that the reference to
measurement is not superfluous here, in so far as a situation may feature unmeasurable intrinsic
properties. We shall see an example of this soon.
Spatial translations and rotations provide familiar examples of strong empirical
symmetries of situations involving geometrical figures in Euclidean space. If S is any figure in
Euclidean space, then a translation and/or rotation N yields a congruent figure N(S). Note that
situations in S related by a transformation N may be in the same or different possible worlds: if N 
is a strong empirical symmetry, then N(S) may be in the same world w as S, but only if w is itself
sufficiently symmetric.
Uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of a set of situations involving
purely mechanical phenomena in a Newtonian world, since a Galilean boost by velocity v applied
vto the situation S of a mechanical system in such a world yields a situation N (S) that is
indistinguishable from S with respect to all measurable intrinsic properties. The special principle
of relativity guarantees that uniform velocity (Lorentz) boosts are also strong empirical
symmetries of electromagnetic and all other phenomena in a special relativistic world. Even when
va situation S actually obtains, N (S)  will rarely do so. In some cases, careful laboratory
vmanipulations may actually bring it about, but the situation N (S) will more typically obtain only
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in some "merely" (i.e. non-actual) possible world. Galileo’s ship provides at best a rough and
approximate realization of the relativity principle it is used to dramatize. A turbulence-free aircraft
in level flight, and a spaceship whose rockets are not firing, supply observable situations that more
closely realize strong empirical symmetries associated with uniform velocity boosts.
This is typical of the observational status of empirical symmetries. Kosso(2000) stated two
necessary conditions for the observation of a symmetry of interest to physics. One must observe
that the specified invariant property is in fact the same, before and after, and one must observe
that the specified transformation has taken place. It follows that an empirical symmetry may or
may not be observable. It may be too hard to create the necessary situations, or to find them
realized in nature: and one may not be able to certify that one has indeed encountered the right
situations. What makes a symmetry empirical is just that the necessary measurements would
reveal it if they could be performed in actual situations. But as the examples of Galileo and
Faraday show, one may be able to observe an empirical symmetry whether or not one has a theory
that accounts for it.
Even though uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of mechanical
processes in a Newtonian world, they do effect a significant change in a mechanical system.
According to Newton, a uniform velocity boost changes the absolute velocity of a system to which
it is applied.  But since Newton’s theory itself implies that this change is not measurable
(assuming that all masses and forces are independent of absolute velocity), no measurements on
mechanical systems confined to situations related by a uniform velocity boost can distinguish
between those situations.
While uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of mechanical processes in
12
a Newtonian world, in a special relativistic world they are not merely strong but perfect
symmetries of all processes. An empirical symmetry N is perfect if and only if any two situations
related by N are duplicates, where a duplicate of a situation is a situation that shares all its
intrinsic properties. Every perfect symmetry is strong, but the converse does not hold, as is
apparent from the example of uniform velocity boosts in the Newtonian world of mechanical
systems: In such a world, subjecting a mechanical process to a uniform velocity boost does not
produce a duplicate process since the absolute velocity of every object is now different. 
3. Theoretical Symmetries
One should distinguish symmetries of a set of situations to which a theory may be applied from
symmetries internal to that theory.  One place to look for theoretical symmetries in a dynamical
theory of physics is in its equations of motion. Since these equations pick out a class of
dynamically possible models, one can alternatively focus on symmetries of this class of models. It
is not necessary to endorse any version of the so-called semantic conception of scientific theories
to acknowledge that many physical theories, as well as theories in other sciences, are often
conveniently characterized by specifying the class of models associated with the theory. Here
models are structures (typically mathematical) that may be used to represent situations. So an
analysis of a theoretical symmetry as a transformation that maps models of a theory onto other
models may be expected to be widely applicable. But what kind of transformation?
On the broadest conception, a theoretical symmetry would be any 1-1 function from the set
of a theory’s models onto itself. But while this is a symmetry of the theory in the sense that it
leaves its model class invariant, it is too broad to be of much interest. As Ismael and van Fraassen
 Ismael and van Fraassen think of a theory as specifying sets of possible worlds (the5
physically possible as a subset of the metaphysically possible), rather than models (regarded as
mathematical structures), which serves to blur this distinction.
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(2003) noted, there are theoretical symmetries in this sense that transform a model of Newton’s
theory with one free particle into models with millions of particles interacting in complex ways.
As an automorphism of the model class of a theory, an interesting theoretical symmetry should
preserve more of the internal structure of the models it relates: cardinality of that structure’s
domain is only one very weak requirement.
Ismael and van Fraassen (2003) entertain another condition: that a theoretical symmetry
preserve qualitative features of every model. They take such features to be “quantities that can
characterize a situation, distinguishable by even a gross discrimination of colour, texture, smell
and so on.” (p376), where (as they have explained) a quality can be regarded as a quantity with
range of values 1 (possessed) and 0 (not possessed). To maintain the present clear distinction
between models and situations, one should rather characterize qualitative features of a model as
those elements of the model that may serve to represent qualitative features (in their sense) of
situations.  They distinguish this condition from a stronger condition–that a theoretical symmetry5
preserve measurable features of a model, where these generally extend beyond qualitative features
in a theory-guided way. Newtonian theory, for example, connects the masses and forces its models
are intended to represent to qualitative features such as positions and times in such a way as to
permit the measurement of the former by observation of the latter.
In the case of space-time theories, a theoretical symmetry might be required to preserve
those features of its models that serve to represent space-time structure, which gives rise to the
notion of a space-time symmetry of a theory. So, for example, space-time translations and
 By, for example,  Earman(1989), Belot(2001), Ismael and van Fraassen(2003),6
Roberts(2008).
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rotations are space-time symmetries of a Newtonian theory, while Galilean boosts are space-time
symmetries only if that theory’s models do not permit the representation of a privileged state of
absolute rest.
The interesting relations among these and related conceptions of theoretical symmetry
have been explored elsewhere.  But there is one conception of theoretical symmetry that is6
narrower than any of them and  may at first sight seem to be of little interest. Perhaps surprisingly,
this is the conception that will shed the most light on perfect symmetries. Accordingly, I will say
that
A mapping f:M 6M of the set of models of a theory 1 onto itself is a theoretical symmetry
of 1 if and only if the following condition obtains:
For every model m of 1 that may be used to represent (a situation S in) a possible world w,
f(m) may also be used to represent (S in) w.
Two models related by a theoretical symmetry of 1 are theoretically equivalent in 1. 
Thus defined, the theoretical symmetries of a theory would include only the identity
mapping if no two of its models could be used to represent the same situation. But we know of
many a theory with a redundant set of models. Among gauge theories, such redundancy is the
norm. In analytic Euclidean geometry, a spatial configuration has many algebraic models,
corresponding to a choice of spatial origin, type of coordinates (rectangular Cartesian, cylindrical
polar, spherical polar, etc.) and choice of coordinate axes and their orientation. Even in a
coordinate-free formulation, general relativity permits the representation of a possible world by
 See the papers by Norton and Stachel in Howard, D. and Stachel, J. eds. (1989).7
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any model from within an equivalence class of diffeomorphically related models. 
The redundancy of representational devices is both a resource and a danger for the theorist.
It permits one to choose whichever of a set of theoretically equivalent models offers the most
convenient representation of a given situation, and so simplifies its treatment within the theory.
But it may also mislead one into believing that a mere choice of representational device has
empirical significance. Einstein himself was so misled while struggling to formulate his general
theory of relativity . For a while he was convinced by the so-called “hole” argument that the7
theory could not be generally covariant, precisely because he had not yet come to appreciate that
diffeomorphically related models merely represent the same possible world.
This conviction was not the result of a simple mistake. The case of analytic geometry is
atypical. It is often hard to say when distinct models of a theory simply represent the same
situation, and when they represent distinct situations. It is especially hard when it is the theory
itself that provides our only initial access to those features of situations it represents by newly
introduced structures–hard, but not impossible. As the next section will show, there are cases
when a theoretical symmetry of a theory itself implies an empirical symmetry of situations it
models. In such cases the empirical symmetry is perfect. While models related by a theoretical
symmetry may always be used to represent the very same situation, here they may be used
alternatively to represent distinct but intrinsically indistinguishable situations.  
5. Explaining Empirical Symmetries
Even when a theory explains an empirical symmetry, the explanation need not appeal to a
16
theoretical symmetry of that theory. Newton’s explanation of the principle of Galilean relativity
provides an example.
Assuming that no masses or forces depend on absolute velocities, Newton’s laws of
motion entail that uniform velocity boosts are strong empirical symmetries of a set of situations
involving purely mechanical phenomena in a Newtonian world. One can use Newton’s theory to
explain the principle of Galilean relativity by noting that we live in an approximately Newtonian
world in which Galilean relativity (restricted to mechanical phenomena) is a consequence of this
strong empirical symmetry of uniform velocity boosts. But a non-zero uniform velocity boost is
not a theoretical symmetry of Newton’s theory. Two models related by such a transformation
cannot be used to represent the same situation, since each would represent the absolute velocity of
every object in that situation differently.
Uniform velocity boosts are dynamical but not theoretical symmetries of Newton’s theory.
Nor are they space-time symmetries of the Newtonian space-time structure on which Newton
based his theory. Earman(1989) argued that any theory whose dynamical symmetries exceeded its
space-time symmetries was not well-formulated, and that it posited excess spatiotemporal
structure. In this case, the excess structure is provided by Newton’s enduring absolute space, the
trajectories of whose points define a privileged but unobservable state of absolute rest. By
eliminating from the models of Newton’s theory anything capable of representing this superfluous
theoretical structure, one arrives at an empirically equivalent theory of which uniform velocity
boosts are theoretical symmetries. In this revised version, Newtonian theory explains the
symmetries associated with Galilean relativity by appeal to these theoretical symmetries. It
thereby exhibits uniform velocity boosts as not merely strong but perfect symmetries of
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mechanical systems in a Newtonian world.
Einstein (1905) extended the set of situations among which uniform velocity boosts are
empirical symmetries to situations involving non-mechanical phenomena, and specifically
electromagnetic phenomena. His reasoning in that paper is interesting. It begins as follows “It is
known that Maxwell's electrodynamics--as usually understood at the present time--when applied
to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena.”
The paper goes on to defend a new understanding of Maxwell’s theory whose application to
moving bodies leads to no such asymmetries. Of course, this new understanding involves the
radical changes in how we conceive of space and time for which Einstein is famous. But from the
present perspective what is striking is the way in which Einstein was able successfully to fulfill
his desire to provide an alternative theoretical explanation of the empirical symmetries of
electrodynamic phenomena which eliminated the theoretical asymmetries in the existing account.
Within the new space-time structure, Maxwell’s theory explained the strong empirical symmetries
of electrodynamic phenomena by deriving them from a theoretical symmetry of the theory. It
thereby exhibited these as perfect symmetries.
These two cases exhibit a very similar structure. We begin with an empirical symmetry.
This is then explained as a consequence of a theory. The explanation entails that the empirical
symmetry is strong, but not perfect. It does not appeal to a theoretical symmetry of the theory
itself. But the theory is perceived as in some measure defective, since its models mark a
distinction between situations–a distinction which that theory itself implies is neither observable
nor measurable by us. Indeed, it is the same distinction in each case–the distinction between one
uniform absolute velocity and another. After the theory has been reformulated, the defect is
 There are also important differences between the cases. Elimination of a structure8
representing absolute space from the models of Newton’s theory did not necessitate any further
radical revisions–in the structure of space and time, or in dynamics: elimination of a structure
representing absolute space from the models of Maxwell’s theory entailed radical revisions in the
structure of space and time, and in Newtonian dynamics. By postulating the special principle of
relativity, Einstein immediately generalized the empirical symmetries of uniform velocity boosts
not just to electrodynamic phenomena but to all physical phenomena; even after its revision,
Newton’s theory only implied that uniform velocity boosts are empirical symmetries of
mechanical phenomena within the scope of the theory. 
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removed. A structure is removed from the models that had been intended to represent the
problematic, unobservable feature of these situations. This introduces a new theoretical symmetry
into the theory, which serves as the basis for a new kind of explanation of the empirical symmetry
that reveals this to be not merely strong but perfect.8
In both these cases, a theory comes to reveal a perfect symmetry by implying that distinct
but symmetrically related situations are in fact duplicates of one another–they share all the same
intrinsic properties. This may seem surprising. As analyzed in section 3, a theoretical symmetry
concerns only a single situation. How can it imply that two distinct situations are duplicates?
Moreover, the puzzle presented in section 2 suggests that there may be theories whose theoretical
symmetries carry no such implication. To remove the surprise and solve the puzzle we need to
exhibit the mechanism by which a theoretical symmetry may be transferred to an empirical
symmetry of situations its models represent. It turns out that this mechanism will work only if the
theory has certain special features.
 How exactly does the theory of special relativity imply that Lorentz boosts are perfect
symmetries of situations represented by its models? Here is a sketch of the argument: further
details are spelled out in the appendix. Consider a local situation S represented by model m of the
special theory of relativity. S is local because it occupies a compact region of space-time. Because
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Lorentz boosts are theoretical symmetries of the theory, S is equally represented by a Lorentz-
!vboosted model mN=7 (m): one can think of mN as representing S from the perspective of a frame
FN moving at velocity v with respect to a frame F from whose perspective S is represented by m.
vNow special relativity itself implies that m also represents a distinct situation SN=7 (S) in exactly
the same way that mN represents S. Since m and mN represent S as having exactly the same intrinsic
properties, it follows that m represents S and SN as having exactly the same intrinsic properties.
Hence special relativity implies that Lorentz boosts are perfect empirical symmetries of all local
situations to which the theory applies.
But doesn’t an exactly parallel argument show that a theoretical gauge symmetry of
classical electromagnetic theory (addition of a constant to the value of the electric potential at
each point inside the cube) implies a corresponding perfect empirical gauge symmetry of the
situation inside Faraday’s cube? It does not, since there is a crucial disanalogy between this case
and the case of Lorentz boosts in special relativity. Special relativity itself implies that situation SN
differs from situation S precisely by application of a Lorentz boost, thereby justifying the equation
vSN=7 (S). It implies that these situations differ in just this way, because every joint model in the
theory of the combined situation SrSN represents S, SN as related by a Lorentz boost. But classical
electromagnetic theory has no corresponding implication.
0 +Classical electromagnetic theory does have joint models of a combined situation C rC
0 +involving the interiors C , C  of uncharged and charged Faraday’s cubes (respectively) that
represent the electric potentials inside the cubes as differing by a real number. But it also has joint
0 +models of that same situation C rC  that represent the electric potentials inside the cubes by the
In such a joint model, electric fields external to the cubes derive instead from a time-9
varying (curl-free) magnetic vector potential. The existence of such models is a simple
consequence of the theoretical “local” gauge symmetry of classical electromagnetism.
+ 0 Thanks to David Wallace for stressing this point. If C  and C  coexist throughout an10
0 +interval of time, this will be a curve in their common space. If C rC  is a situation in which a
+single uncharged cube is charged, so that C  is its equilibrium internal situation at a later time
0than C , then it will be a time-like curve.
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same constant value . So while an argument parallel to that in the case of Lorentz boosts in special9
+ 0 +relativity does establish the existence of a situation C  distinct from C , it does not prove that C  is
0related to C  by an empirical gauge symmetry. Gauge symmetry is merely a theoretical symmetry
of classical electromagnetism, and implies no corresponding empirical symmetry, perfect or not. 
+ 0The relation between C  and C  is worth considering further, because these situations are
related by an empirical symmetry that does not correspond to any empirical gauge symmetry. Note
+ 0first that C  is related to C  by a space-time translation–certainly a perfect symmetry of classical
electromagnetism, but by no means an empirical gauge symmetry. But the empirical symmetry
+ 0relating C  and C  may appear richer and more interesting than a mere space-time translation.
The charge accumulated on the surface of the charged cube will give rise to an electric
0 +field outside the cubes. Every joint model in classical electromagnetic theory of a situation C rC
+ 0incorporating C  and C  must represent this electric field. The line integral L of this electric field
along a curve joining any two points, one in the interior of the charged cube, the other in the
0 + +interior of the uncharged cube, is an invariant of all situations C rC  incorporating both C  and
0 0 +C .  So classical electromagnetic theory implies that the transformation C  6C  is an empirical10
symmetry that seems to be more than just a space-time translation, and indeed this is a perfect
empirical symmetry.
 One can alter the size of their relative 3-velocity by changing frames, but this merely11
changes how their 4-vector relative velocity is projected onto different hyperplanes of
simultaneity. The magnitude of the difference in 4-velocities is Lorentz invariant.
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0 +But while the value of L represents a relation between C  and C , this relation obtains only
by virtue of their relations to the electromagnetic situation outside the cube(s). In David
0Lewis’s(1986, 62) terminology, it is neither an internal nor an external relation between C  and
+C . I follow custom in calling a relation (e.g. having the same owner) whose obtaining depends on
relations between its relata and some distinct object (e.g. the owner) an extrinsic relation. The line
integral of the electric field joining points in the interior of the cube(s) represents an extrinsic
0 +relation between C  and C . To suppose one can change the electromagnetic condition inside
Faraday’s cube by charging its exterior is just as mistaken as to think one can move a car from
New York to Los Angeles merely by selling it.
Despite appearances, according to classical electromagnetism the only empirical symmetry
+ 0relating C  and C  is a space-time translation. This is  not an empirical correlate of the theoretical
local gauge transformation of adding a constant (L) to the value of the electric potential at each
point inside the cube. Moreover, a constant difference in electrostatic potential is not an invariant
0 +of the models of C rC  within classical electromagnetism. Contrast this with the case of Lorentz
boosts in special relativity, where every model agrees on the size of the velocity difference
between boosted and un-boosted situations.  In classical electromagnetic theory, the perfect11
+ 0empirical symmetry between C  and C  does not reflect a theoretical gauge symmetry.
Another way to see this is to note that this empirical symmetry is also a consequence of a
formulation of classical electromagnetism whose models include no gauge potentials, but only
+electric and magnetic fields. While these suffice to exhibit the extrinsic difference between C  and
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0C  represented by the line integral of the electric field between them, the models of this
formulation admit no gauge transformations of which these are invariant magnitudes.
It is natural to describe the state of Faraday’s cube when charged by saying that it has been
raised to an electric potential with respect to the ground. But this is not something that we
observe—all we observe are differences in electric field outside the cube when charged and
uncharged. And it is not entailed by classical electromagnetic theory, since that theory has models
that represent this electric field as arising not from a difference in electric potential, but from
variations in magnetic vector potential.
+ 0It is interesting to note that the empirical symmetry between C  and C  does reflect a
0theoretical symmetry of a different theory. Classical electrostatics with potentials can model C ,
+ 0 + 0 +C  and C rC . But in classical electrostatics the only models of C rC  are those that represent
0two distinct cubes at rest with respect to one another. Moreover, every such model represents C ,
+ 0 +C  as at different electrostatic potentials N , N  respectively. In this way, classical electrostatics
+ 0 represents a relation between C  and C that is external rather than extrinsic. This theory not only
+ 0implies a perfect electrostatic empirical symmetry between C  and C : it also implies that this
uniquely corresponds to the theoretical gauge symmetry of adding a constant to the value of the
electric potential at each point in a model of a local situation. In classical electrostatics, but not the
full theory of classical electromagnetism, some gauge symmetries are empirical.
In a world with static electricity but no magnetism, the empirical success of electrostatics
might have justified belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory in which the only joint models of
0 +the combined situation C rC  represented an electric potential difference between the cubes of the
0 + 0same constant value )N. In such a world, the limited theoretical gauge symmetry N  6N  =N +)N
 For which, see Earman and Norton (1987) and the literature it spawned: and Howard,12
D. and Stachel, J. eds. (1989) for details of Einstein’s original “hole argument”.
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would have implied a corresponding empirical gauge symmetry. We would have had indirect
empirical evidence that differences in electric potential are real, as are transformations from one
state of electric potential to a state of lower or higher potential—just as, in our world, we have
(both direct and) indirect evidence that differences in uniform velocity are real, as are
transformations from one uniform velocity to another.
6. Conclusion
I conclude by drawing some morals from this investigation of perfect symmetries. The first moral
is that most, if not all, empirical symmetries relate local rather than global situations.
Sometimes a symmetry masquerades as empirical when it is a merely theoretical symmetry
of a theory’s global models. Gauge theories provide examples of this General covariance provides
another important example.
In discussions of the general covariance of a space-time theory like the general theory of
relativity, it is important to distinguish covariance of a theory’s equations under smooth
coordinate transformations from diffeomorphic equivalence among models of the theory. This
distinction is commonly glossed by calling a coordinate transformation passive while a manifold
diffeomorphism is active. The terminology suggests that while performing a coordinate
transformation in a generally covariant theory merely leads to an alternative representation of a
given situation, performing a diffeomorphism on a model results in a model of a physically
distinct situation. Taking this suggestion seriously leads to the notorious “hole argument” .12
 Some may suppose that space-time substantivalism provides such a reason. I disagree.13
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Diffeomorphisms are theoretical symmetries of a generally covariant theory. But a
symmetry of global models of such a theory (i.e. models that serve to represent all of space-time)
cannot imply a corresponding empirical symmetry in accordance with the argument illustrated in
the previous section and detailed in the appendix. Lacking such an argument, there seems no good
reason to believe that the theoretical symmetry under diffeomorphisms of a generally covariant
theory reflects any corresponding empirical symmetry . Indeed, careful general relativity texts13
now point out that diffeomorphically related models merely offer alternative representations of the
same global situation.
Contrast this with another instance of a symmetry related to general relativity, this time
involving local situations. On the road to general relativity, Einstein focused on a particular
empirical symmetry of gravitational phenomena that followed from the equality of (passive)
gravitational and inertial mass. Measurements of mechanical phenomena cannot distinguish a
situation involving a uniform gravitational field from a similar situation involving a uniform
acceleration. Consequently, 
“The gravitational field has only a relative existence... Because for an observer freely falling from
the roof of a house - at least in his immediate surroundings - there exists no gravitational field.”
Einstein called this “the happiest thought of my life”! His general theory of relativity finally
enabled him to account for the perfect empirical symmetry among situations in which we take a
system to be subject to no gravitational field.  A diffeomorphism applied to a local model of a
freely-falling system will produce a model of a distinct situation involving a similar freely-falling
system elsewhere in a common space-time.
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The second moral is that even though empirical symmetries concern nature rather than our
representations of it, theories are very important tools in revealing perfect empirical symmetries.
One reason is that theoretical models often introduce the structures that provide our best
way of representing situations related by a perfect symmetry. Many symmetries of Euclidean
geometry may be represented without introducing mathematical structures such as real numbers to
serve as measures of angles and lengths. But it is not so easy to represent empirical Lorentz boost
symmetry or flavor SU(3) symmetry (say) without appeal to a fair amount of the mathematical
structure that accompanies theoretical models of those symmetries.
A second reason is deeper. Real life situations almost never display perfect empirical
symmetries. The world is a complicated and messy place, and actual situations are rarely
duplicated in all their details. In theory construction physicists abstract from and idealize real life
situations in order to focus on what they consider their essential features. Debs and
Redhead(2007) mark this process by interposing what they call a conceptual model between a
situation in unvarnished nature and a mathematical model that a theory uses to represent it. While
a brilliantly original thinker like Galileo may have been able to arrive at a good conceptual model
without the aid of a theory, I believe it is increasingly common for physicists to view the world
through the lens of their theories. From this perspective, the mathematical model may precede the
conceptual model in their thinking, in which case the features of an actual situation will naturally
come to be represented in terms of the theoretical models applied to it.
For these reasons, when a theory reveals an empirical symmetry as perfect, it may not
simply recharacterize a previously acknowledged empirical symmetry. Rather, the theory gives us
a new way of conceptualizing the situations it relates, along with a set of mathematical models to
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represent them. If there is an isomorphism between model and (idealized) situation, this is then
something that is read into the situation by reconceptualizing its structure, rather than discovered
on the basis of an independent, pre-existing description of that situation.
This has implications for the notion of intrinsic properties. Recall that situations related by
a perfect empirical symmetry are duplicates–each shares all intrinsic properties of the other. When
a theory exhibits a perfect empirical symmetry corresponding to a theoretical symmetry, it thereby
displays or at least circumscribes what these intrinsic properties are. It is through the development
of physical theories that we learn more about the fundamental intrinsic properties of the world.
In this way we get a better grasp not only on the list of intrinsic properties, but also on
what it is for a property to be intrinsic. Here is a way in which physical science merges with
metaphysics. A property of an object (or a relation among objects) in a situation is intrinsic just in
case objects in duplicates of that situation share that property (or relation). Duplicate situations are
those that are related by perfect empirical symmetries. The progress of physical theorizing gives
us richer and more widely applicable models with which we are able successfully to represent
situations. Physics claims a perfect empirical symmetry when it is implied by a theoretical
symmetry of such models.
According to Lewis (1986, 60) “What physics has undertaken, whether or not ours is a
world where the undertaking will succeed, is an inventory of the sparse properties of this-worldly
things.” The sparse properties are supposedly those that “carve at the joints”: he later calls such
properties natural. But we do not need to assume our world comes “pre-packaged” in order to
appreciate the significant improvements in and enrichments of our categorizations made possible
by advances in our physical theories.
Appendix
Let ;  2M() be structures with domains D; D respectively.
Since  2M(), there is a possible situation a and a bijective representing
function ra such that  represents a via ra (ra : Da ! D, where Da is the
domain of objects in a).
Suppose that ' : M() ! M() is a theoretical symmetry of , with
 = '(). Then  also represents a via r0a = '  ra (r0a : Da ! D). Moreover,
' denes a bijective map ' : D ! D between the domains of ; .
Now make the following
Assumption: h; h dene embeddings of ;  as substructures 0; 0 of a
structure    2 M() with domain D such that D0 = h(D); D0 =
h(D) and D0 ; D0  D with D0 \D0 = ;.
Then 0 represents a in    via the bijective function h  ra : Da !
D0 . Since    2 M(), this representation of a may be extended to a
representation of a situation a b of which a is a sub-situation, via a bijective
function r : Dab ! D such that rDa = h  ra. Then 0 represents a and
0 represents a sub-situation b (via r), where Db is the domain of objects in b,
and Da \Db = ;, since r is bijective.
Now consider the function rb  h 1 

rDb

:  represents b via rb. Moreover
rb 6= r0a, since they have non-overlapping domains. So  not only represents
situation a via r0a,  also represents a distinct situation b via rb. a and b are
distinct because    models a situation a  b incorporating both a and b as
sub-situations with non-overlapping domains.
Now specialize to a case in which we are considering a theory  that models
the behavior of physical systems located in a xed, at space-time. As model of
such a space-time we have a structure < M;Ai >, where M is a 4-dimensional
di¤erentiable manifold representing space-time, and the Ai are xed geometric
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object elds representing the at space-time background.
For a special relativistic theory, the Ai include the Minkowski metric tensor 
determining the light-cone and spatio-temporal metric structure, and the unique
compatible symmetric a¢ ne connection D that makes this a at a¢ ne space,
representing the inertial structure.
For a Newtonian theory, the Ai include objects representing an absolute
temporal as well as spatial metric, a at a¢ ne connection compatible with
these dening the inertial structure, and possibly also a vector eld dening
a timelike congruence of inertial lines representing the trajectories of points of
absolute space.
A global model of extends this model of space-time to a model< M;Ai; Oj >
of dynamical processes in space-time by the addition of geometric object elds
Oj intended to represent such processes. For example, source-free electromag-
netism includes the Maxwell-Faraday tensor Fab, intended to model the behavior
of electromagnetic elds.
But will also be assumed to possess local models of the form< U;AiU ; Oj >,
where U is a 4-dimensional submanifold of M , the AiU are restrictions of the
Ai to U , and the Oj are geometric object elds on U intended to model the
behavior of systems in a restricted region of space-time modeled by U .
Now consider two models ;  2M() of :  =< U; AiU ; Oj >;  =<
U ; AiU ; O

j > related by a theoretical symmetry ' that denes a di¤eomor-
phism ' : U ! U representing a space-time translation: AiU j'(x) = AiU jx.
 represents a situation a via representing function ra : Ra ! U, where Ra
is the region of space-time occupied by a.  also represents a via r0a = '  ra.
Assumption: There exists a structure    2 M() of the form <
U;AiU ; Oj > such that ;  are each sub-structures of  with U \U = ;:
where U; U  U , AiU = (AiU )U , AiUb = (AiU )Ub , Oj = OjU ; O

j =
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OjU .
N.B. The Assumption may hold when ' itself simply represents a space-
time translation: in that case, Oj = '
Oj , where '
 is the drag along of ': 
'Oj
 j'(x) = Oj jx. We are chiey interested in cases in which the transfor-
mation ' represents something other than a simple space-time translation.
In   ,  represents a via the bijective function ra : Ra ! U. Since
 2M(), this representation of a may be extended to a representation of a
situation ab of which a is a sub-situation, via a bijective function r : Rab ! U
such that rRa = ra. Then  represents a and  represents a sub-situation b,
where Rb is the space-time region occupied by b, and Ra \ Rb = ;, since r is
bijective.
Now  represents b via rRb . Moreover rb 6= r0a, since they have non-
overlapping domains. So  not only represents a via r0a,  also represents a
distinct situation b: a and b are distinct because    models situation a  b
incorporating both a and b as sub-situations occupying disjoint space-time re-
gions.
So when the Assumption holds, the theoretical symmetry ' implies a perfect
empirical symmetry f between situations a and b. For a single model of 
(namely ) may be used to represent either situation.
But what kind of symmetry is f? In particular, is it some new dynamical
symmetry that is uniquely represented by '?
Suppose that    represents a  b via r, and that ' does not simply
represent a space-time translation.
There may be a distinct model  that also represents a  b via r : indeed,
any non-trivial theoretical symmetry of  applied to    will produce such
a model. If some model  2 M() representing a  b represents a and b as
related just by a space-time translation, then ' does not represent some new
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dynamical symmetry: it relates distinct situations that  can represent (by )
as di¤ering simply by a space-time translation.
Suppose on the other hand that every structure  related to    by a
theoretical symmetry of  represents a as di¤ering from b in some way that does
not correspond to a mere space-time translation. Suppose further that there is
some new dynamical relation R' that all such models  represent a as bearing
to b, and that this depends uniquely on ' (as the notation R' indicates). R' is
a new dynamical relation since it is represented in  by a di¤erence between
the Oj and the '
Oj that would have represented the space-time translates of
the Oj if ' had simply represented a space-time translation of a to b. Then the
theoretical symmetry ' of  implies a corresponding new dynamical symmetry
f . f is a perfect empirical symmetry of situations modeled by , and any two
f -related situations are related by R' :
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